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The purpose of this thesis is constructing a workable 
philosophical justification for judicial decision-making 
within a liberal political framework. The thesis begins 
with an historical evaluation of the law-morals separability 
thesis through the natural law and positivist traditions, 
then advocates the acceptance of Ronald Dworkin's later 
position, with some significant additions. After showing 
the exemplification of the theory advocated here in case 
law, the thesis concludes by placing itself within the 
liberal political tradition and defending against the criti­
cal theorists' tradition and the charge of absolutism and 
nihilism.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis begins with an examination of how the rela­
tion between what the law is and what it ought to be has 
been viewed in the natural law and positivist traditions.
The law—morals separability thesis is often held pivotal in 
understanding the difference between these traditions. This 
topic is also an excellent preface to the substantive issues 
of law addressed here. The thesis first considers the 
natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, as Thomas is the 
archetype for all subsequent natural law theories. After 
addressing a common misinterpretation of Thomas' work, the 
thesis turns to H.L.A. Hart's criticism of Blackstonian 
natural law.^ The "methodological natural law" theory of 
David A.J. Richards is next outlined as an example of a com­
bination of natural law and positivist positions. After 
rejecting Richards' position as unsatisfactory, the thesis 
next focuses on Ronald Dworkin's "naturalist" approach to 
law and maintains that Dworkin provides the conception of 
law best able to account for the true nature of judicial 
decision making, while remaining faithful to those ideals 
which do or should animate the law. The thesis next 
suggests an addition to Dworkin's theory based on a prin­
cipled manner of discourse, the contention being that this 
addition further strengthens Dworkin's analysis. Chapter 
One then concludes with a return to Thomas to show how
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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natural law is similar to the position developed here.
Chapter Two then outlines two cases from different 
substantive areas of law to exemplify the type of legal 
justification advocated here. Griswold v. Connecticut,  ̂ the 
well-known contraceptive case, is used as an example of 
principled decision making in constitutional law, while 
MacPherson v. Buick,  ̂ is the example from tort law.
Chapter Three concludes the thesis by placing the con­
ception of judicial decision developed here within the 
liberal legal tradition. After explaining what liberalism 
is, the argument here is defended against the critical 
theorists, who attack traditional liberalism at its roots. 
The thesis then concludes with a defense of the liberal 
position developed here against absolutism and nihilism.
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CHAPTER I
"The debate between natural law theory and legal posi­
tivism is as ancient as philosophical thought about law and 
its fundamental moral purposes. In general, the debate cen­
ters on the answer to the simple question: Must a law, in
order to be a law, be morally justified?"4
The natural law tradition generally answers this 
question in the affirmative. A.P. d'Entreaves stated: "The
close association of morals and law is the distinguishing 
mark of natural law theory thoughout its long history. The 
very enunciation of natural law is a moral proposition."^
It is instructive to look first at St. Thomas Aquinas 
and his definition of eternal law. In Question 91, Art. I 
of the Summa Theologica, Thomas states:
. . . a law is nothing else but a dictate of
practical reason emanating from the ruler who 
governs a perfect community . . . . [t]he whole
community of the universe is governed by Divine 
Reason. Wherefore the very idea of government 
of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has 
the nature of a law. And since the Divine 
Reason's conception of things is not subject to 
time but is eternal . . . therefore it is that
this kind of law must be called eternal.®
Thomas had perhaps the most elaborate metaphysical
development of natural law. For Thomas, natural law
involved an interpretation of man's nature and his relation
to God. Natural law was conceived as closely tied to the
eternal Divine order which brought all things into being.
3
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Thomas believed that all things partake of the eternal law 
and "from its being imprinted on them, they derive their 
respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends."7 
Man participates in the Eternal Reason in recognizing the 
natural inclination to his proper act and end. "This par­
ticipation of the eternal law in the rational creature is 
called the natural law."® Thus, natural law is man's par­
ticipation in eternal law.
The light of natural reason, whereby we discern 
what is good and what is evil, which is the 
function of the natural law, is nothing else 
than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It 
is therefore evident that the natural law is 
nothing else than the rational creature's par­
ticipation of the eternal law.®
Thomas, therefore, does not see natural law as something 
totally different from the eternal law, but as "nothing but 
a participation thereof.
Thomas is sometimes accused of confusion regarding the 
is/ought distinction, i.e., of not understanding the dif­
ference between law and morality. d'Entreaves argues, 
however, that the entire history of natural law involved 
". . . painstaking efforts to delimit the two spheres and to
get to the core of their difference. That Thomas clearly 
understood this difference is shown by his analysis of human 
law.
" . . .  from the precepts of the natural law, as from
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general and indemonstrable principles . . . human reason
needs to proceed to the more particular determinations, 
devised by human reason, are called human laws . . . ."12
In Question 95, Article I, Thomas says that human laws were 
necessary to keep depraved people restrained from evil by 
use of force and fear, both to leave others in peace and to 
eventually become virtuous through practice, i.e., to act 
out of choice instead of fear. "Therefore, in order that 
man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws 
to be framed."11 In Article II, Thomas quotes Augustine 
with approval and makes an addition: "'that which is not
just seems to be no law at all'" Wherefore the force of a 
law depends on the extent of its justice."1^ These Articles 
show human law is a human invention created to restrain 
wrongdoers. The force of a human law depends on its being a 
just law. Human law, therefore, is not equated with justice 
or morality. The fact of a human law does not mean that the 
law is, ipso facto, just.
In Question 96, Thomas addressed the power of human 
law. In Article I, Thomas says the end of law is the common 
good and, therefore, "human laws should be proportionate to 
the common good."1^ The common good, according to Thomas, 
is complex and cannot be determined by a single con­
sideration. "Wherefore laws should take account of many
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. 
Because the community of the state is composed of many per­
sons; and its good is procured by many actions. Human 
law, Thomas maintains, is formed for community and not indi­
vidual action. With regard to the degree of certainty 
possible, he says that it is wrong to seek the same degree 
of certainty in all things. "Consequently in contingent 
matters, such as natural and human things, it is enough for 
a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number 
of instances, though at times and less frequently it 
f a i l s . T h u s ,  human law is designed to bring about the 
common good, taking many considerations into account, and 
will sometimes, perhaps even often, be mistaken.
In Question 91, Art. II, Thomas discusses whether it is 
proper for human law to "repress all vices." Men differ 
greatly in their degree of "virtue" and human law is framed 
for a wide variety of humans. Therefore, "human laws do not 
forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only 
the more grevious vices . . . chiefly those that are to the
hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human 
society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits
murder, theft and such like. Thus Thomas shows his 
belief in the difference between human law and morality and 
his conception of the limited role of law in acting out the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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moral life.
Human law, for Thomas, also differs from both natural 
law and eternal law: "The natural law is a participation in
us of the eternal law: While human law falls short of the
eternal l a w . H u m a n  law, it is seen, has a limited func­
tion in Thomas' philosophy of law.
Now Augustine says (de Lib. A nb. i5): "The law
which is formed for the government of states, 
allows and leaves unpunished many things that
are punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this
law does not attempt to do everything, is this a
reason why it should be blamed for what it does.
Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit 
everything that is forbidden by the naturallaw.20
In Question 96, Art. 4, Thomas addressed the question
of whether human law binds a man in conscience. Thomas sta­
tes that laws are either just or unjust and, if just, bind 
one in conscience, with the power of the eternal law. Such 
laws are "legal laws."21 Thomas then divides unjust laws 
into two categories: those opposed to human good, and those
opposed to Divine good. Those laws opposed to human good 
might be burdensome, against the common good, might go 
beyond a law giver's power, might impose unequal burdens, 
e tc. "The like are acts of violence rather than laws; 
because Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i.5), 'a law that is
not just, seems to be no law at all.' Wherefore such laws 
do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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scandal or disturbance . . . ."22 Thomas uses idolatry as
an example of a law opposed to the Divine good. "Laws of 
this kind must nowise be observed, because, as stated in 
Acts V.29, 'we ought to obey God rather than m e n . '"23
That Thomas saw human law as very distinct from mora­
lity is shown by his statements regarding enforcement of 
unjust laws: "The power that man holds from God does not
extend to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man
bound to obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or 
inflicting a more grievous h u r t . " 2 4  Thomas was careful to 
show that what i^ the law is not necessarily what ought to 
be the law. A law opposed to human good, an unjust law, is 
"an act of violence," and is not law. The only reasons 
which Thomas gives for obeying an unjust law are avoidance 
of scandal or causing a greater hurt through disobeyance. 
The second kind of unjust laws, those against the Divine 
good, should never be obeyed, as they are directly opposed 
to the laws of God and, for Thomas, would involve peril of 
one's soul.
The Scholastic natural law tradition, therefore, as 
exemplified by Thomas, had a clear grasp of the difference 
between "legal conformity and the moral value of action"25 
and foreshadowed a distinction between the moral and legal 
spheres. While Thomas and the Schoolmen may have unduly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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stressed the moral aspect of law or the legal aspect of 
morals, they were well aware that there were differences 
between t h e m . 26
H.L.A. Hart, in his well known article "Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals,"27 makes a compelling case 
for the positivist insistence on the separation of law and 
morals. Bentham and Austin, Hart begins, constantly 
insisted on the need to distinguish law as it is from law as 
it ought to be. The Utilitarian movement stood for all the 
principles of liberalism in law and government, such as 
liberty of speech and press, the right of association, the 
need to make laws widely known and published before they 
were enforced, and the principle of no criminal liability 
without f a u l t . 28 Hart cautions against taking the simpli­
city of the Utilitarians for superficiality and uses Bentham 
on slavery as an example. Bentham said the issue was not 
one of whether slaves can reason, but simply whether they 
s u f f e r . 29 Once it is acknowledged that the Utilitarians 
worked for a better society and better laws, then it is 
possible to turn to the separation of law and morals they 
advocated in the proper light.
Austin believed God's commands were fundamental prin­
ciples of morality, with utility as an index. Bentham 
insisted on the distinction between law as it is and ought
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to be, though for him the distinction was based solely on 
the principle of utility and not on belief in God. Austin 
and Bentham formulated the separation doctrine as an answer 
to Blackstone's position, which they found confused and 
misleading. They interpreted BlacJcstone as saying that a 
human law which conflicts with Divine law is simply not a 
law. Thus, Blackstone, according to their criticism, 
acknowledged no separation of law and morals.
Hart argues that it was their intention to enable 
people to see the issues brought out by the existence of 
morally bad laws and to understand the authority of a legal 
o r d e r . B e n t h a m ,  in particular, thought that two errors, 
both in Blackstone, were created by the failure to separate 
law and morals. The first error consists in someone saying 
"This ought not to be law, therefore it is not and I can 
disregard it." The peril of this approach he saw as 
anarchy, i.e., that law and its authority are negated by a 
person's conceptions of what the law ought to be. The 
second error, even more evident in Blackstone, is to say 
"This is the law, therefore it is what it ought to be." The 
danger here is a very conservative view, permitting existing 
law to replace morality as the final test of conduct and so 
escape criticism.31
Thus the positivists saw the distinction between law
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and morals as a way of assuring the criticism of the law. 
They saw themselves as reacting against two negative impli­
cations of Blackstone's work, namely the tendency toward
anarchy on one hand and conservatism on the other.
Later in his article. Hart turns to a discussion of the 
argument that positivism aided the horrors of the Nazi 
regime by advocating subservience to "mere law" and the 
failure of the German legal system to protest against the 
wrongs they were required to act out in the name of law. He
argues that this post war insistence on joining law and
morals overlooks precisely the point Bentham and Austin were
making about the separation required to enable criticism of
morally evil laws. Hart argues persuasively that it is an 
enormous overvaluation of the bare fact that a rule of law 
is valid to think that this is conclusive as to the question 
of whether this law should be obeyed. "Surely the truly 
liberal answer to any sinister use of the slogan 'law is 
law' or of the distinction between law and morals is, 'Very 
well, but that does not conclude the question. Law is not
morality; Do not let it supplant morality.'"32
Hart thus relies on the purpose of the positivist 
distinction between law and morals to show that it is a fun­
damental misunderstanding of positivism to blame it for 
aiding the rise of the Nazis to power. Hart does not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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dispute, however, that such misunderstanding may have some­
how provided support for the rise of totalitarianism.
Hart next turns to an evaluation of a trial of a war 
criminal after the war. The example he uses is a woman who 
wished to be rid of her husband and turned him in to the 
authorities for insulting remarks he made about Hitler while 
home on leave from the German a r m y . 33 The husband was 
arrested and sentenced to death, though he was actually sent 
to the front. A court of appeals found her guilty of pro­
curing the deprivation of her husband's liberty, even though 
he was sentenced by a court for violating a statute, since 
the statute "was contrary to the sound conscience and sense 
of justice of all decent human beings."34 Though this was 
hailed as a triumph of natural law. Hart thinks it an unwise 
decision. He advocates the introduction of a law, which the 
State would admit to be retrospective, as the lesser of two 
evils; leaving her unpunished or enacting retrospective 
criminal legislation. Although both the natural law and 
positivist approaches lead to the same result (punishing the 
woman). Hart sees the vice of the Blackstone natural law 
approach as a lack of candor and a romantic optimism which 
conceals the difficult nature of the moral choice involved. 
To say, with the Blackstone natural law interpretation, that 
the Law of the Reich was not law is certainly philosophi­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
cally confusing and not accepted by most people. How is it 
not law? The Utilitarian approach has the benefit of 
clarity by holding that "laws may be law, but too evil to be 
obeyed."35 Hart's argument is well-reasoned and per­
suasive. He squarely faces the tough issue of the necessity 
of making an undesirable moral choice with clarity, versus 
an interpretation which introduces more problems than it 
solves.
A. persuasive point in Hart's analysis is his argument 
that the distinction between law as it is and ought to be 
need not involve adopting a subjectivistic, relativistic or 
noncognitive stand on moral values and judgments. First, 
the Utilitarians themselves did not accept a subjectivistic 
view. Hart argues that the positivist distinction has been 
confused with noncognitivism. A noncognitive moral theory 
holds that statements of fact (what ^  the case) belong to a 
radically different category than value statements (what 
ought to be the case). Basically, statements of what are 
statements of fact and can be argued for in a rational way, 
while statements of value are non-cognitive and cannot be 
argued for rationally like statements of fact. We must add 
a non-cognitive statement to a statement of fact to equal an 
" o u g h t . "36 This is subjectivistic or relativistic because 
moral judgments are not rationally discoverable or deba-
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table. "They are 'fiats of the will,' expressions of 
'emotions,' 'preferences' or 'attitudes.'"37
Opposed to this view is the belief that is/ought, 
fact/value distinctions are wrong. This entails. Hart says, 
the belief that moral values are imposed on us by the 
character of our world and are not just emotion, feelings, 
attitudes, etc. Moral argument is not therefore reduced to 
shouting commands or expressing feelings or emotions, but 
involves a process whereby the parties acknowledge after 
examination and reflection "that an initially disputed case 
falls within the ambit of a vaguely apprehended principle," 
as cognitive or rational as any other disputed classifica­
tion of particulars.38
If the second view were accepted, this would not change 
the function of the distinction between the law as it is and 
ought to be. Morally bad laws would still be laws and 
demonstrating something morally desirable would not make it 
law. Therefore, Hart argues, whether one accepts a subjec­
tivist view of the nature of moral judgment or accepts the 
view that values are imposed by the character of the world 
makes little difference. This can be true in a narrow sense 
for the distinction between the law as it is and ought to 
be, but the difference is important in a broader sense, as 
will be brought out later in this thesis. Consider now an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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attempted further development of the positivist's position 
by David A.J. Richards.
David A.J. Richards in "Rules, Policies, and Neutral 
Principles; The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and 
Constitutional Adjudication^"39 gives a general defense of 
Hart's positivist theory. He makes an exception, however, 
for constitutional law, which he acknowledges may be better 
explained by a quasi natural law theory of legal reasoning.
Richards begins by saying natural law has insisted on a 
conceptual link between law and morals and positivism has 
insisted on their conceptual separability. He states that 
legal positivism's insistence on the law-morals separability 
thesis is the sounder position. Richards notes that the 
separability thesis is different from the idea of some legal 
positivists, notably Hans Kelsen, that the legal system can­
not logically be the subject of moral criticism. Richards 
thinks Kelsen's position is false and mentions Bentham's 
insistence that the separation of law and morals would faci- 
litate criticism. Richards also distinguishes the separabi­
lity thesis from the institutional claim of some positivists 
that a judge cannot invoke moral standards as extra-legal 
norms unless those moral standards play a role in the legal 
system, i.e., unless the judge is "invited" to develop moral 
standards.'**^ One can accept the separability thesis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Richards argues, and reject this institutional claim. A 
judge could appeal to extralegal standards "as part of the 
judicial function of doing justice" or "the moral duties of 
a judge" may require an appeal to extralegal standards.41 
All Richards means is that judges can appeal outside the 
moral norms of the institution. However, he does not here 
provide any justification for such an appeal, nor is he able 
to within the positivist conception.
Richards then makes an argument for what he calls 
"methodological natural law,"^2 based on the empirical 
observation of a substantial interconnection between legal 
and moral concepts in many concrete legal institutions. 
Methodological natural law is a tool for examining the moral 
conceptions that underlie our institutions. Richards calls 
it a natural law theory because: (1) the focus is on the
moral dimension of laws, unlike legal positivism which tries 
to characterize only the pure legal element in law; and (2) 
the moral principles, on which the theoretical account may 
rest, are objective principles of moral reasonableness, 
similar to those which natural law theory traditionally used 
to assess legal systems.
In The Moral Criticism of Law, R i c h a r d s  expands his 
view by saying the purposes of methodological natural law 
theory are both descriptive and critical. By descriptive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
Richards means that the meaning and purposes of moral ideas 
present in legal institutions will be brought out. The 
second aspect is that "the moral analysis will provide a 
critical moral point of view form which legal doctrines may 
be assessed and appropriate reforms s u g g e s t e d
Richards concludes the article by saying that it is 
proper to focus on areas where law and morals systematically 
interconnect, especially constitutional law, to show the 
working out of his theory. When one does this, Richards 
maintains, it is clear that methodological natural law gets 
at a truth in the natural law conception, without actually 
being a natural law p o s i t i o n . I t  does this by permitting 
the law to draw upon morals when, but only when, the law 
does interconnect with morality. Richards uses the First 
Amendment as an example of this interconnection of law and 
morality.
Richards claims his position shares a fundamental 
kinship with positivism because: "At bottom, the concern of
both approaches is the same: how may the philosophical arts
of critical se1f-coneiousness clarify and guide the 
enlightened moral criticism of law?"^7 The problem with 
Richards' position is that, while he is right that the moral 
criticism of law is the purpose of both positivism and 
natural law theory, one must adopt a moral foundational ism
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for such moral criticism to be effective. Adopting such a 
position will inevitably lead Richards to cross over into a 
real natural law position.
To restate, Richards is correct to focus on "the moral 
analysis of concrete legal institutions and issues,"48 but 
it is philosophically unsatisfying to use moral principles 
as if they were universal natural law principles which 
everyone accepted and not state the basis or foundation for 
using such principles. Richards tries to avoid these dif­
ficulties with natural law by interjecting specific moral 
conceptions to be used for moral analysis and criticism. He 
then acts as if the moral theory were there, first to be 
found in, for example, the First Amendment, and secondly 
that this moral conception, once found, could then be used 
to criticize the implementation or acting out of such a 
princple.^9 An obvious and serious danger in this approach 
is exposed when we recognize that talk about "the central 
moral value of the First Amendment,"^® as if this value were 
clearly one thing as opposed to another, does not 
acknowledge that one brings a moral conception of the world 
to bear in this evaluation.
In summary, it seems that Richards is attempting to 
claim a value neutrality by acting as if the values being 
used were implicit in past judicial tradition and practice
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and that this presence, in and of itself, is enough to com­
pel us to continue to apply these principles. This seems 
just plain mistaken. Even if we could identify the moral 
values behind specific constitutional provisions, and this 
is granting a lot, we will still need to determine whether 
these values were worth preserving and fostering. 
Constitutional adjudication is not a mechanical act and 
should not be treated like one. Let us turn now to Ronald 
Dworkin for an analysis of the problems with Richards' posi­
tion .
Dworkin's reply to Richards is in Taking Rights 
Seriously^^ and a more recent paper where he further deve­
lops his "naturalist" position. Dworkin begins by saying 
that Richards agrees that principles play an important role 
in determining what the law is on some matter, but Richards 
believes that traditional legal positivism "which insists 
that what the law is is just a matter of fact, is neverthe­
less s o u n d . "52 Positivism, Richards argues, can admit the 
role of principles of law because the question of what role 
these principles play in the legal system is a question of 
fact and how the principles are applied in each case is "a 
matter of ordinary professional j u d g m e n t . ”53 Dworkin quotes 
Richards' argument as follows:
Legal principles are, after all, legal; in order 
to be binding, they must be implicit in past 
judicial tradition and practice, inferable by 
the usual methods of legal reasoning by
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analogy . . . .  Legal principles, like legal 
rules, depend at bottom on an issue of fact, that is, the critical attitudes of j u d g e s . ^4
Dworkin disagrees, first, that the identification of 
legal ideas is simply a matter of ordinary fact. Most prin­
ciples judges cite are controversial, at least as to weight, 
and "many appeals to principle are appeals to principles 
which have not been the subject of any established judicial 
practice at all."55 Dworkin states that one can make per­
suasive arguments to adopt one theory of law as superior to 
another when theories conflict- These arguments, however, 
must go beyond the limits which a positivist conception is 
ready to accept as proper, in that they must taken into 
account arguments from normative political theory. Indeed, 
Dworkin claims that a person's theory of law will include 
almost all the political and moral principles to which he 
subscribes, so these will all play a role in the justifica­
tion of the legal s y s t e m . 56
By "implicit" Richards does not mean, Dworkin argues, 
that there must be a tradition of actually citing these 
princples or that these principles follow deductively from 
precedents, since these are both clearly false. The prac­
tice of justification does not always use principles pre­
viously cited and deductive logic plays little or no role in 
judicial decision m a k i n g . 57 Dworkin concludes that he does
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not actually know the way that Richards means that princples
must be implicit in past judicial tradition and practice,
but suggests Richards may be adopting a view similar to that
of Rolf Sartorius, who holds that one purported theory of
explanation will always provide a better fit with the data
of a particular case based on "canons of explanation used in
the sciences, and judges do and should choose that
t h e o r y . D w o r k i n  admits that he used to hold a view very
similar to this, but came to reject it. He then states a
central element of his concern with the sort of position
Richards and the positivists advance:
I do not think that there are agreed criteria of 
superior theoretical explanation even in the 
case of scientific explanation, and experience 
shows that in the case of law one account is 
often preferred to another on reasons that can­
not realistically be understood as reducible to 
the relative number of earlier decisions 
explained, or the simplicity or elegance of the 
explanation . . . .  If judges did decide cases 
by citing canons of theory construction, 
counting the number of precedents explained by 
competing hypotheses, and contrasting the 
theoretical elegance of these hypotheses, we 
might at last have a genuine example of 
"mechanical" decision making . . . supposed to
be derogatory in law, though not . . .  in other 
fields where a moral dimension is lacking, likec; Qengineering.
Sartorius' position, then, is self-deceptive, as it 
would have us believe that judges were just "following 
procedures," as it were, instead of making moral choices. 
Dworkin's position here has an existential dimension in
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that, in Sartre's words, Sartorius is choosing not to 
choose. That is, he is acting as if the morality of the 
particular person did not play a role and that the judge is 
just a sort of neutral instrument through which the various 
factors are funneled. The danger here is the loss of a 
moral dimension through a kind of self-delusion. Whenever 
the moral dimension is lost, the real risk is that of a 
wasted life, of leading a life which is not "well lived," as 
Socrates meant this, where one lives in a moral vacuum.
Richards insists the princples implicit in past tradi­
tions and practices must be a matter of fact in order to 
resist the view that law is always morally sound and the 
counterpart, that morally evil laws are not laws, i.e., the 
traditional positivist distinction between what the law is 
and ought to be. Richards, Dworkin asserts, sees only two 
alternatives: (1) the positivist claim that it is always a
question of fact that the law is; or (2) the extreme natural 
law position, which maintains that there can be no dif­
ference between princples of law and principles of morality. 
Dworkin rightly rejects this false dichotomy.
What the law requires may depend on "what background 
morality r e q u i r e s , s o  it is not merely a question of 
fact. Dworkin uses as examples: instances where the
legislature puts moral tests into legal rules; cases where
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the legislature says nothing about its intent; when specific 
legal principles embodying moral concepts are decisive of a 
legal issue; and when the question at issue is what 
princples are decisive. However, from the position that 
morality is rightly considered part of the law, it does not 
follow "either that the law is always morally right, or that 
what is morally right is always the law, even in hard 
cases."61
Dworkin does adopt the position that legal principles 
are always moral principles in form, though they need not 
always be sound or correct moral principles. By moral, 
Dworkin means that the princples in legal arguments "make 
claims about the rights and duties of citizens and other 
legal people rather than stating, for example, prudential 
judgments or historical generalizations."62 Thus, Dworkin 
recognizes and acknowledges the human element of making a 
"claim" and of then providing the best possible justifica­
tion for that claim, consistent with the background and 
institutional history of the area.
In summary, Dworkin accepts the law-morals separability 
thesis, in that he believes the law is not always moral and 
morality is not always law. Dworkin does believe, however, 
that legal princples are always moral principles in that 
they invoke a statement of value about that principle.
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These claims would be provided with a foundation by the 
political morality of the judge, all things considered, con­
sistent with the history and tradition of the right which 
went before. This leads me to Dworkin's later, more deve­
loped presentation of these issues.
Dworkin gives a more detailed version of his natural 
law position in a recent article, "'Natural' Law 
Revisited. He begins by saying that any theory which 
makes the content of law sometimes depend on the answer to 
some moral question is a natural law theory. Dworkin 
acknowledges he is a natural law theorist in this sense and 
then defends this position, which he calls "naturalism." 
Naturalism holds that judges should decide hard cases in the 
following way: "by trying to find the best justification
they can find, in principles of political morality, for the 
structure as a whole, from the most profound constitutional 
rules and arrangements to the details of, for example, the 
private law of tort or contract."64 This is a principled 
approach, since any attempted justification will have to 
address the question of the best justification and must also 
state these princples as precisely as possible. Dworkin's 
judge, working within this system, is able to provide only a 
partial justification— as opposed to the full justification 
of Hercules in the "Hard Cases" section— since he is only
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human. This description of partial justification is impor­
tant, however, because it helps define the consistency 
required of a judge. "A judge should regard the law he 
mines and studies as embedded in a much larger system."^5 
It is always relevant, therefore, for the judge to look 
further and ask whether his judgments are consistent with 
the whole system of law. This is a natural law theory, 
since each judge's decision about what past law requires 
will be tempered by his own political morality, i.e., the 
best political justification of that law.
Dworkin gives an example of what he calls extending a 
discipline into the future by examining its past in an ana­
logy to the literary process. Imagine being handed the 
first few chapters of A Christmas Carol and being told to 
add a chapter to the novel, with the directions to make the 
best novel possible. When done, it is sent to another per­
son with the same directions, etc. The writer will be faced 
with a sense of interpretation which Dworkin thinks is ana­
logous to the naturalist judge. In making this the best 
possible novel, one must be respectful to what is already 
there in the text, i.e., one must not follow an interpreta­
tion ruled out by the text.
Dworkin then supposes two possible interpretations of 
Scrooge. The first is that he is inherently wicked, an
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example of the degradation of which human nature is capable.
The second is Scrooge as inherently good, but progressively
corrupted by false values and the perverse demands of high 
Capitalist Society.^6 The interpretation adopted will make 
an enormous difference how the work continues. The aim is 
to create the best novel one can, while still making it a 
single work of art, i.e., to respect the text and not 
interpret the character in a way which it rules out. If the 
text is blatantly inconsistent with one interpretation, this 
alternative is ruled out. If the text is equally consistent
with both, one can choose. You will then choose the one,
Dworkin says, that makes the work more significant or other­
wise better, depending on your own experience with people 
like Scrooge. Dworkin then raises the crucial question—  
what if you believe one interpretation i_s better than the 
other, you agree with it, think it is a more profound 
insight into human nature, etc., but this will be incon­
sistent with more things in the text, i.e., more things will 
be regarded as mistakes under this interpretation? You must 
then ask which interpretation makes the work better on the 
whole--it is not simply a mechanical matter of choosing the 
interpretation which brings out fewer "mistakes," since the 
less favored interpretation may well be a less revealing 
picture of human nature.67,68
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Dworkin thus believes that a judge should decide new 
cases in the spirit of a novelist in a chain writing a fresh 
chapter. One does not have a clean slate, but is required 
to go on as before. "The best interpretation of past judi­
cial decisions is the interpretation that shows these in the 
best light . . . politically, as coming as close to the
correct ideals of a just legal system as possible."69
Dworkin is concerned with the possibility of subjec­
tivism, of letting the judge's personal evaluation be the 
sole criterion for decision. But Naturalism, as he con­
ceives it, only allows a limited use of a judge's beliefs of 
what political and personal rights people have "naturally," 
i.e., apart form the law. The "brute facts of legal 
history"^® will limit discretion and assure that the judges 
beliefs are not the only test of law. If the judge uses too 
much discretion, there will be too little integration, too 
much legal history will have to be viewed as accidental. An 
Agatha Christie mystery can't be made into a philosophical 
exploration of death, for example, even if the latter were a 
more desirable enterprise.
The judge has an obligation to continue the past, not 
invent a better one. Showing history as incoherent or an 
unprincipled chaos does not provide the best possible justi­
fication for a legal decision. This does not rule out.
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however, a dramatic reinterpretation, such as the one given 
negligence law in MacPerhson v . Buick by Justice Cardozo, 
which unifies what went before and shows prior decisions in 
a clearer light.
Though judges can have different conceptions of what 
counts as a fit, the essential thing is to address these 
questions in a principled way. This, indeed, is what 
naturalism demands. Dworkin is concerned to give us a 
"working style of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " ^2 because interpretation 
cannot be mechanical. One must have principles as guides, 
but there is a distinction between fit and substantive 
justice. Detailing of the requirements of substantive 
justice is impossible and deceptive. Dworkin requires 
judges to reflect "on the full set of the substantive and 
procedural political rights of citizens a just legal system 
must respect and serve.
The rest of Dworkin*s article is interesting and per­
suasive, but can be given short summary for purposes of the 
discussion here. Dworkin looks at various challenges to 
naturalism and essentially deals quite effectively with 
them. He rejects subjectivism by rejecting the 
"demonstrability thesis." He argues naturalism is not 
undemocratic because democracy requires the law be as prin­
cipled and coherent as possible. Naturalism also best
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respects the right of each person to be treated by his 
government as an equal, a right crucial to d e m o c r a c y .
Against the instrumentalist claim that naturalism is "crazy" 
for being tied to the past, Dworkin argues "it is unfair to 
reach a decision which offends the best interpretation of 
the p a s t . H e  states in clear and powerful terms that 
naturalism best brings out issues of political morality 
which need to be addressed, using the example of slavery. 
Does a slaveholder have the right to enforcement of the 
constitutional system on his behalf, e.g., to keep his sla­
ves imprisoned at home? A naturalist judge might think he 
does not because no one can have a right to the equal bene­
fit of wicked laws. "In that case you would decide against 
the slaveowners if you could, because the underlying reason 
for your concern with the past, which is people's abstract
rights to institutional consistency, would have exhausted
.. , _ „ 7 7  Dworkin seems to say that when the abstractIts power. ''
rights run out, one is then left to rely on the best 
possible justification, which would take into account the 
right to a public order which treats all people as equals. 
Finally, Dworkin concludes this section by stating it does 
not matter if one uses naturalist, traditional natural law 
or positivist terminology in not upholding the rights of 
slaveholders. "For the important issue is not what you say, 
but what you d o . I  take this as consistent with
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Richards’ position that the purpose of both natural law and 
positivism is to be able to criticize the law. In spite of 
their differences, both Dworkin and Richards share this fun­
damental insight.
Dworkin concludes the article by addressing the two 
ideals of our political system. One is an external ideal, 
that of a perfectly just and effective system. This is a 
challenge to legislation, political will and the community's 
sense of justice. The second ideal is internal, that of 
itself made pure. This is the challenge to adjudication, to 
make the standards which govern our lives articulate, 
coherent and effective. People will disagree about which of 
these ideals should have precedence, but this is inevitable 
whenever a community recognizes people "have rights beyond 
the strict and narrow limits within which everyone agrees 
what these rights are."79 Naturalism seems the best method 
for providing principled justification, even if it will 
sometimes create controversy and small confusions, because 
"naturalism at least takes the actual political order, pro­
perly interpreted, as the common standard, so that citizens 
are encouraged to put to themselves the same questions that 
officials who adjudicate their disputes will ask in judging 
them."80 Dworkin believes we should strive for these 
ideals and says the courts play an indispensable part in our
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actions— the courts are the forum for the internal ideal of 
making the standards which govern our lives articulate, 
coherent and effective.
Dworkin's position is compelling for several reasons. 
First, it allows for the bringing in of "values." "Values" 
is, of course, an all inclusive word, i.e., it can be used 
by subjectivists or absolutists. "Value" is used here in 
the sense of a principle that can be raised and debated in a 
principled manner. For example, one can say that people 
have a right to equal respect and concern or have a right to 
be treated as ends in themselves and not as means to some 
end. One would then point to situations where this right is 
not respected, e.g., slavery or sexual abuse, and point to 
the results. The results might be very low conception of 
self worth, wide-spread pain and suffering, guilt on the 
oppressor's part, etc. Using this method, one points to the 
things one is speaking on behalf of, testifies on their 
behalf and then appeals to the common experience of the 
listener. Some of the best examples of this method of 
discourse come from the New Testament. For example, when 
Jesus is approached by the rich man in Matthew 19:16-22, he 
is asked what must be done to have eternal life. Jesus 
gives him a list of six commandments, what the law requires. 
When the rich man answers that he follows all these and asks
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what he still lacks, Jesus tells him to sell all he has and 
give the money to the poor and follow him, "But when the 
young man heard that he went away sorrowful: for he had
great possessions."81 This passage is very instructive. 
Jesus appealed first to the law and secondly to a principle 
not in the law. He answered the young man’s questions in a 
principled way, even if the advice was very difficult to 
follow. I quoted the last verse of their encounter because 
it shows that it is always a possibility with this method of 
argument that the listener will not be convinced. One can 
testify to one's own experience, point to the sources of the 
experience, appeal to commonality and the listener may still 
not be convinced— he can still walk away. Dworkin’s expla­
nation allows for this sort of experience because the poli­
tical morality of a judge, all things considered, is used in 
reaching a justification for particular decisions. This 
allows for dialogue and a principled approach to these 
issues of value, using the method of testimony and appeal.
One also needs to reject, as Dworkin argues, the 
demonstrability thesis in moral matters. It is perhaps 
enough to say that the thesis itself is undemonstreble and 
therefore fails under its own criteria. In summary, the use 
of "values" is essential in legal justification, and 
Dworkin's position provides a principled approach which
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argues for these values, while clearly acknowledging they 
are not absolute.
Dworkin's method, combined with that of testimony and 
appeal, brings value decisions out front, that is, it does 
not hide behind a belief that the values are somehow 
nuetrally in the system calling only for the use of 
"prudential judgment" in their application, a la Richards. 
Richards* position is mistaken, though it is a common con­
ception of the way legal decisions are made. In addition to 
being misleading, it can be a dangerous position because it 
does not acknowledge the personal involvement of the deci­
sion maker. It can lead to an amoral, mechanical view of 
the law, which is simply contrary to the reality of the 
involvement of the decision maker.
Kierkegaard emphasized this existential aspect of life 
against Hegel's "pure thought." Kierkegaard's criticism of 
the tendency toward abstraction is applicable to Richards' 
theory of judicial decision making. "In Greece, as in the 
youth of philosophy generally, it was found difficult to win 
through to the abstract and to leave existence, which always 
gives the particular; in modern times, on the other hand, it 
has become difficult to reach existence. The process of 
abstraction is easy enough for us, but we also desert 
existence more and more, and the realm of pure thought is
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the extreme limit of such desertion. In Greece, philo­
sophizing was a mode of action, and the philosopher was 
therefore an existing i n d i v i d u a l . "83 Dworkin's approach is 
more honest in acknowledging legal reasoning as a "mode of 
action" and the judge as an "existing" individual confronted 
with difficult moral decisions.
Finally, the naturalist/testimony and appeal position 
is better able to give an account of the force behind the 
law. It is better able to speak up on behalf of those 
things which give life to the law, which brought the law 
into being. It seems to belittle rights to say that we 
ultimately have them only because they ware written into the 
U.S. Constitution or they are part of our legal inheritance, 
etc. When one thinks of the freedoms of speech, religion 
and press or the equal protection clause, one does not think 
of a document, a lifeless piece of paper.
It is essential to address the things which gave rise 
to the document, the force behind our still accepting it, if 
we are to have a faithful application of these rights in the 
future. This might mean looking at the conditions existing 
in England at the time of the American Revolution. A look 
at the abuses of the English system will indicate why the 
Framers insisted on rights having force against the state.
It would also mean giving examples where people were not 
treated with equal respect and concern and making appeals to
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the commonality of the listeners. This approach would rely 
on the Constitutional provisions, explicit and implicit, 
would recognize that a court can get around, or indeed throw 
out, provisions when the life has gone out of them, when 
they cease to be living ideas. Keeping this force alive 
means being faithful both to the history and tradition of 
the Constitution and to the things themselves, i.e., that 
which gave power to the ideas which gave rise to the 
Constitution. This is the idea of values coming from the 
world which Hart made reference to in claiming that a sub­
jectivist position did not make a difference in the applica­
tion of the law-morals separability thesis. In his limited 
context, I agree, but when one looks at the broader context 
of the law as only alive because of the force behind it, I 
think one's philosophy becomes vitally important and subjec- 
tivisim is an unacceptable alternative.
It is important to note a vital similarity in St. 
Thomas' work and the position this thesis develops. If one 
leaves out Thomas' metaphysics, natural law can mean 
something like testimony and appeal. While a Thomist might 
argue that natural law is based on the word of God as 
reflected in man's reason, this thesis argues for an 
acknowledgement of the forces which animate the law and for 
testimony on their behalf. Though there are serious and
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important differences between the positions/ they share a 
fundamental insight in that they both see judicial decision­
making as a process informed by extra-legal concerns. They 
both require fidelity to those extra-legal concerns, thereby 
avoiding an anchorless, subjective stand. They both view 
the law as more than "fiats of the will" and exercises of 
raw power. They share a fundamental concern with the 
correct application of law, i.e., that the law be properly 
administered in individual cases. Finally, they share a 
commonality of purpose in being true to the "things 
themselves." If, that is, law is a reflection of reality 
"out there," however dimly or vaguely it is perceived, one 
must at all times strive to give a true interpretation of 
these things. Thus, even though a naturalist/principled 
analysis would not meet the metaphysical standard of proof 
which a traditional natural law theorist might require, 
Thomas' position is critically similar in its faithfulness 
to principle and those things which animate the principles.
In summary of this chapter, the law-morals separability 
thesis can and should be accepted. Traditional natural law, 
as exemplified in Thomas, has not denied this distinction. 
Dworkin, is right, however, that legal principles are moral 
statements in form, in that they make claims about rights 
and values, i.e., they require a "claimer." One must be
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careful not to fall into subjectivism and the method of 
testimony and appeal, with the support of the Constitutional 
materials, avoids this. Therefore, the law-morals separabi­
lity thesis need not lead to an abandonment of a naturalist 
position. Indeed, it seems that any legal position becomes 
incoherent without adopting such a naturalist foundation.
The naturalist model Dworkin proposes provides a good 
starting framework for a theory of law which can be most 
faithful to those things which sustain us. There is, of 
course, no certainty that a judge working in such a manner 
will be a better judge. He could be demented, create deci­
sions most people disagree with, or simply abuse his power. 
However, this is always true of a judge, even a traditional 
positivist. Naturalism at least has the benefit of putting 
the decisions out front, "so that citizens are encouraged to 
put to themselves the same questions that officials who 
adjudicate their disputes will ask in judging them."84 it 
is perhaps true that one cannot ask more of any legal 
system.
At this point in the thesis it is important to 
demonstrate just how the position advocated here works in 
practice. It is the purpose of the next chapter to show 
this practical application, through the use of case law.
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It is important that one actually show the working out 
of a legal theory in concrete terms, i.e., in case law. The 
areas of constitutional law and tort both offer excellent 
examples of the application and use of a broad 
naturalist/principled discourse approach to judicial 
decision-making. The right of privacy, specifically 
Griswold V. Connecticut, is a good example of the working 
out of constitutional law theory, while product liability 
law, specifically MacPherson v. Buick, shows how naturalist 
principles operate in the tort area. Griswold will be exa­
mined first, as constitutional law is a clearer example of 
the working out of principle in the law since constitutional 
law is generally based on principle, unlike the common law 
(case law) tradition inherited from England. The MacPherson 
case will then be analyzed as an example from the common law 
tradition.
The first case addressed to show the working out of a 
broad naturalist/principled legal analysis is Griswold v. 
Connecticut. Griswold involves the constitutionality of two 
Connecticut state statutes. The first statute made it a 
crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent 
conception. The second statute prohibited any person from 
giving information, medical advice or counseling regarding
38
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the use of contraceptives. Appellant Griswold was Executive 
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut.
Dr. Buxton, a licensed physician and Medical Director for 
the Planned Parenthood League, is also an appellant in this 
case, as he prescribed the contraceptive devices to the 
couple involved in this case. The lower court found both 
appellants guilty as accessaries and fined them $100 each. 
The couple who sought contraceptives through Planned 
Parenthood were married. The Court allowed the appellants 
standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married 
couple and quickly turned to the merits of the case.
Justice Douglas, writing the majority opinion, begins 
with the statement that the court is not a "super­
legislature" which evaluates the worth of economic, business 
or social laws. The Connecticut law, however, is different, 
as it involves the intimate relations of a husband and wife. 
J. Douglas then turns to the First Amendment and lists 
numerous ways in which "the State may not . . . contract
the spectrum of available knowledge."®^ He lists several 
instances where the Court has protected "peripheral rights" 
in order to secure specific rights. He then states; 
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance."®® These guarantees, J. Douglas
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maintains, create "zones of privacy." Though Justice 
Douglas places a strong emphasis on the right of privacy as 
found in the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, he also 
mentions the Third and Ninth Amendments as creating such 
zones of privacy.
The Connecticut statutes, Douglas argues, impinge on 
the marriage relationship, which is "within the zone of pri­
vacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees."®”̂ Douglas strikes the statutes down as unnec­
essarily broad and invading the areas of protected freedoms. 
Enforcement, Douglas contends, would involve searching a 
married couple's bedroom, an idea which "is repulsive to the 
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."®®
It is a generous evaluation of Douglas' opinion to say 
it is unclear. It is frankly baffling exactly on what the 
decision turns. He mentions six amendments and does not 
explicitly say which amendment or argument is determinative. 
The "penumbras, formed by emanations" language is often 
attacked as oracular in nature or even nonsensical. At one 
point Justice Douglas cites six cases as precedent and says 
"These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which 
presses for recognition here is a legitimate one."89 The 
key to this opinion, it _is clear, is his belief that the 
marriage relationship lies within the zone of privacy
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created by several fundamental constitutional rights.
Though there is not much substance to Douglas' opinion, or
what is substantive is at least confusing, he does write
well, particularly in the last paragraph of the opinion:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the 
Bill of Rights— older than our political par­
ties, older than our school system. Marriage is 
a coming together for better or for worse, hope­
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred. It is an association that pro­
motes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in 
living, not political faiths; a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet 
it is an association for as noble a purpose as 
any involved in our prior decisions.
The first concurring opinion was written by Justice
Arthur Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and
Justice William Brennan. It is a long and complex opinion,
but important to this thesis.
Justice Goldberg begins with the statement that liberty
is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights,
but protects fundamental personal rights, including the
right of marital privacy, equal protection and the right to
pursue an occupation, which are not explicitly in the
Constitution. He relies on precedent, i.e., former U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, and refers to the Ninth Amendment.
He quotes from an earlier Supreme Court case, Snyder v.
Massachusetts, a s  follows: "The Court stated many years
ago that the Due Process Clause protects those liberties
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that are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental92This is an argu­
ment from both precedent (former case law) and history and 
tradition.
J. Goldberg then turns to the Ninth Amendment and 
addresses at length the intent of the Framers, particularly 
Madison, with regard to its enactment. The Ninth Amendment 
reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people." The Amendment was the work of 
Madison and, Goldberg argues, was designed to address the 
fear that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not 
be sufficiently broad to protect all the essential rights 
and the specific mention of certain rights might be seen as 
a denial that other rights were also protected.
J. Goldberg then quotes Justice Story, from his 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
(1891), as a sort of history or tradition of interpretation 
regarding the Ninth Amendment. J. Goldberg summarizes by 
saying: "These statements of Madison and Story make clear
that the Framers did not intend that the first eight amend­
ments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental 
rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people."93
Justice Goldberg next turns to an historical analysis
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of the Ninth Amendment. While the Ninth Amendment has not
often been relied on by the Court, it has been part of the
Constitution since 1791, is intended to have weight, and
should be given effect.
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental 
and so deep-rooted in our society as the right 
of privacy in marriage may be infringed because 
that right is not guaranteed in so many words by 
the first eight amendments to the Constitution 
is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and give it noeffect whatsoever.
Justice Goldberg again refers to the intent of the Framers 
that there exist fundamental rights not specifically enu­
merated and the Bill of Rights is not exhaustive of those 
rights. The Supreme Court has often held that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments protect certain fundamental liberties 
from infringement by both federal and state government. 
Goldberg's use of the Ninth Amendment, therefore, merely 
"serves to support what this Court has been doing in pro­
tecting fundamental rights.
Goldberg also answers Black's charge, in a dissenting 
opinion, that his Ninth Amendment analysis turns 
"somersaults with h i s t o r y . J *  Goldberg argues he is 
being faithful to history. Though the Ninth Amendment ori­
ginally was concerned only with restrictions on federal 
power, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states as well 
from abridging fundamental personal liberties. "And, the
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Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties 
are specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments, is 
surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamen­
tal personal rights, now protected from state, as well as 
federal, infringement."98 He summarizes with the statement 
that the Ninth Amendment "simply lends strong support" to 
the view that the "liberty" interests protected by the 
Constitution are broader than those listed in the Bill of 
Rights.
The argument now takes an interesting turn. J.
Goldberg addresses the charge of subjectivism, i.e., the
claim that his interpretation would leave judges "at large
to decide cases in light of their personal and private
notions."100 In answering this charge, he refers to several
important statements by the Supreme Court regarding the
sources of its holdings affecting fundamental rights. This
is an argument based in precedent and an attempt to show the
principles underlying this series of cases. In speaking of
judges, J. Goldberg states:
They must look to the "traditions and 
[collective] conscience of our people" to deter­
mine whether a principle is "so rooted [there]
. . . as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder
V. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105. The 
inquiry is whether a right involved "is of such 
a character that it cannot be denied without 
violating those 'fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all 
our civil and political institutions'. . . ."
Powell V. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67. "Liberty" 
also "gains content from the limitation of . . .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
specific [constitutional! guarantees" and "from 
experience with the requirements of a free society." Poe v. Oilman, 367 U.S. 497, 517.101
Justice Goldberg is criticized by Justice Black in 
dissent because use of this terminology and tradition will 
require "judges to determine what is or is not constitu­
tional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are 
unwise or unnecessary."102 Justice Black's criticism of 
Goldberg's analysis will be addressed later in this paper.
J. Goldberg further says that privacy is a fundamental 
personal right which, again quoting Poe, arises "from the 
totality of the constitutional scheme under which we 
live."103 He quotes Justice Brandeis, from 01mstead v. 
United States,104 on the principles underlying the constitu­
tion's guarantees of privacy, to the effect that the makers 
of the constitution "conferred, as against the Government, 
the right to be let alone— the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized m e n . "105
Justice Goldberg cites Meyer v . Nebraska,105 Pierce v . 
Society of Sisters,10^ and Prince v. Massachusetts,108 in 
support of the position that the Court’s decisions "have 
respected the private realm of family life which the State 
cannot enter."109 The Connecticut statutes, he points out, 
seek to regulate a vital and sensitive area of privacy, 
viz., marital sexual relations and home life. "Of this
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whole 'private realm of family life' it is difficult to ima­
gine what is more private or more intimate than a husband 
and wife's marital relations."HO This is an appeal to com­
monality, as no authority is cited for this position. 
Goldberg states it as a given that nothing is more intimate 
between married people than sexual relations.
He speaks of the "entire fabric of the 
Constitution,"111 demonstrating that marital privacy is a 
fundamental right. He then makes a personal statement which 
again involves testimony as to the force of the right of 
privacy in marriage and an implicit appeal to the com­
monality of the reader: "Although the Constitution does not
speak in so many words of the right of privacy in marriage, 
jC cannot believe that it offers these fundamental rights no 
protection."112 Justice Goldberg could develop this aspect 
of his argument more fully by addressing the sanctity of 
marriage on a more personal level and appealing to the com­
monality of the listener. It should be noted, however, that 
such an approach is implicit in his argument, as Goldberg is 
acknowledging his position as an existing individual who is 
asked to evaluate a law which is said to encroach upon a 
constitutionality protected fundamental right. He 
acknowledges the "I," the existing individual, who is forced 
to take a stand on an issue, here the decision regarding the
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Connecticut statutes, based on the best possible information 
he can gather. This acknowledgement of the human existen­
tial perspective is, I believe, essential to honest and 
effective judicial decision making and contrasts markedly 
with the position that one is just following precedent, 
i.e., judge as "cog" in a mechanical process which need only 
be set in motion by earlier decisions. Goldberg's open 
acknowledgement of his involvement in the issue he is 
deciding is honest and important in avoiding both a mechani­
cal jurisprudential approach and a "sub specie alternatus" 
viewpoint, both of which see the issue as patently clear and 
requiring no "messy" human decision making.
Justice Goldberg further argues that letting the 
Connecticut statutes stand would permit "experimentation by 
the states in the area of the fundamental personal rights of 
its citizens. " Ü 3  The State, Goldberg argues, does not have 
this power. He then uses an analogy to the State decreeing 
that all married couples be sterilized after having two 
children. Even though the law might be thought "silly" (the 
words used in dissent by J. Stewart), it would not be sub­
ject to constitutional challenge as the Constitution does 
not specifically prevent the government from abridging the 
marital right to bear children and raise a family. "If upon 
a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, 
by the same reasoning, a law requiring complusory birth 
control also would seem to be valid."114 j. Goldberg, of 
course, thinks both laws represent an unconstitutional 
intrusion on the right of marital privacy.
Since the Connecticut statutes impose upon a fundamen­
tal personal right, Goldberg argues, the state must prove a 
"compelling state interest" to justify the law. A showing 
of a mere "rational relation" of the law to the desired 
result is not enough to pass constitutional requirements. 
This is a reliance on precedent and past decisions affecting 
the constitution. Connecticut argues there is a rational 
relation between the law and its desired result {prevention 
of extra-marital affairs). However, even this burden is not 
met by the state. The statute is unnecessarily broad and 
intrudes on the privacy of all married couples. The State's 
interest in safeguarding marital fidelity could be served 
more effectively by a more precisely drafted statute. J. 
Goldberg cites NAACP v. Button,^15 for the principle that;
"[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area 
so closely touching our most precious freedoms. since 
the statute is unnecessarily broad, it cannot stand.
J. Goldberg concludes his opinion by distinguishing his 
position from the proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or
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misconduct. Again quoting from Poe, J. Goldberg approves; 
"It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to 
forbid extra-marital sexuality . . . or to say who may 
marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a 
marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to 
regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that 
intimacy.
J. Goldberg's opinion is a good example of a principled 
judicial decision of the type argued for here. He 
repeatedly relies on precedent, i.e., judicial tradition, 
and the intent of the Framers, i.e.. Constitutional tradi­
tion. He addresses the criticism that his position is sub­
jective and adopts an existential perspective in openly 
acknowledging his involvement as decision maker. He testi­
fies regarding the sanctity of marital privacy from this "I" 
perspective. He also fruitfully uses analogy at one point 
in the opinion. The opinion is a fine example of the best 
possible justification, all things considered, for reaching 
a judicial decision.
The second concurring opinion was written by Justice 
Harlan. J. Harlan agrees with the judgment, but for dif­
ferent reasons. He sees the proper question as "whether 
this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates
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basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 
Palko V. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319, 3 2 5 . j. Harlan 
believes that it does and that one need not even refer to 
any specific right in the Bill of Rights, or "any of their 
radiations."119 He then makes the now famous remark; "The 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my 
opinion, on its own bottom."120
Justice Harlan then takes issue with the position of 
dissenting Justices Black and Stewart, who advocate an 
"incorporation" approach to constitutional law. First of 
all, Harlan claims, there are no historical grounds for 
adopting an incorporation position. Secondly, it is an 
illusion to believe that limiting the content of Fourteenth 
Amendment due process to the protection of rights found only 
in the Bill of Rights will confine judges to "interpreting" 
specific constitutional provisions and restrain injection of 
their own ideas of constitutional right and wrong into the 
"vague contours of the Due Process Clause."1^1
This is an insightful observation by J. Harlan. He 
believes in "judicial self restraint," but thinks Black's 
suggested formula for achieving it "is more hollow than 
real."122 This is because "'Specific' provisions of the 
Constitution, no less than "due process," lend themselves as 
readily to "personal" interpretations by judges whose 
constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution in
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supposed 'tune with the times.'"12 3 Thus Harlan wisely 
rejects any mechanical or "neutral" theory of judicial deci­
sion making. Harlan's position is that it is impossible to 
avoid injecting personal interpretations into constitutional 
analysis. It is certainly impossible to avoid personal opi­
nions by claiming to "interpret" the Bill of Rights by means 
of an incorporation approach. This is further acknowledge­
ment of an existential perspective, i.e., one which openly 
acknowledges the limited perspective of the existing indivi­
dual as the basis for judicial decision making.
On the other hand, J. Harlan is not advocating a rela- 
tivistic approach to law, i.e., where law is dictated merely 
by the personal, subjective opinions of judges. He believes 
in judicial self-restraint, which can only be brought about 
by: (1) continual insistence upon respect for the teachings
of history; (2) solid recognition of the basic values which 
underlie our society; and (3) appreciation of the importance 
of federalism and separation of powers in establishing and 
fostering freedom in American.
J. Harlan admits that adherence to these principles 
will not do away with differences of interpretation 
regarding the Constititution. Nor, he adds, should it 
attempt to do so. Continued recognition of these principles 
will, however, "go farther toward keeping most judges from
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roaming at large in the constitutional field than will the 
interpolation into the Constitution of an artificial and 
largely illusory restriction on the content of the Due 
Process Clause."125
J. Harlan advocates a principled approach based on 
respect for our history, values and political heritage.
This principled approach allows for the use of testimony and 
appeal and is amenable to a naturalist interpretation. It 
does not attempt to decide cases by fiat, but leaves room 
for disagreement and principled debate over these important 
issues. The restraints placed on the judges will, however, 
keep them from roaming wherever they please in search of a 
rationale. Just as importantly, Harlan charges Justice 
Black with holding a self-deceptive position. The decision 
maker/observer is always bound up with what is being 
understood. The key to judicial restraint is an openness, 
sensitivity and faithfulness to those things which animate 
the law. It is this faithfulness to the most significant 
and widest possible justification for decision making which 
leads to the best possible judgment, all things 
considered.
Justice Black wrote a long dissent, which can be 
distilled for purposes of this paper. He begins by saying 
that "evil qualities" in a law do not make it
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unconstitutional.127 This gist of J. Black's 
"incorporation" approach to constitutional law is that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates into law only the 
"specific" provisions of the Bill of Rights. "I like my 
privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless com­
pelled to admit that government has a right to invade it 
unless prohibited by some specific constitutional 
provision."128 j. Black disagrees with Justices Harlan and 
Goldberg and posits that neither the Due Process clause nor 
the Ninth Amendment could ever be a proper basis for invali­
dating the Connecticut statutes. He accuses them of using 
the power of the Court "to invalidate any legislative act 
which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or
offensive."129
Justice Black next lists the "catchwords and catch 
phrases" which judges have used to strike down laws "which 
offend their notions of natural justice."130 He sees the 
Court as giving itself the power to invalidate all state 
laws it deems "to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or 
oppressive, or on this Court's belief that a particular 
state law under scrutiny has no "rational or justifying" 
purpose, or is offensive to a "sense of fairness and 
justice."Ill Black saw any theory based on "natural jus­
tice" as requiring judges to make a totally subjective deci­
sion, i.e., as deciding the constitutionality of a law "on
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the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or 
u n n e c e s s a r y ."132 He goes on to point out that no specific 
Constitutional provision gives this "supervisory veto" over 
legislative policy decisions. He then makes a statement 
which advocates a universal constitutional imprimatur for 
legislative decisions: "perhaps it is not too much to say
that no legislative body ever does pass laws without 
believing that they will accomplish a sane, rational, wise 
and justifiable purpose."133 That is, since there is always 
a rational legislative intent, and legislative intent is 
determinative of the constitutionality of a state statute, 
all legislative actions pass constitutional muster.
J, Black sees practically any judicial invalidation of 
legislative actions as "natural law due process 
p h i l o s o p h y . "134 The Court, Justice Black believes, only 
measures constitutionality by its own personal standards and 
then applies words like "arbitrary, capricious, unreaso­
nable, accomplishes no justifiable purpose," etc., to cover 
up the personal nature of these decisions. J. Black uses a 
quotation from a treatise by Justice Learned Hand, which he 
adopts without reservation:
Judges are seldom content merely to annul the 
particular solution before them; they do not, 
indeed they may not, say that taking all things 
into consideration, the legislators' solution is 
too strong for the judicial stomach. On the 
contrary, they wrap up their veto in a protec­
tive veil of adjectives such as 'arbitrary,'
'artificial,' 'normal,' 'reasonable,'
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'inherent,' 'fundamental,' or 'essential,' whose 
office usually, though quite innocently, is to 
disguise what they are doing and impute to it a 
derivation far more impressive than their per­
sonal preferences, which are all that in fact 
lie behind the decision.
Black uses this quotation as an appeal to precedent, or at 
least to a well known legal scholar, in support of his posi­
tion .
Black further says the intent of the Framers was not to 
give the federal courts power to recommend or veto bad or 
unwise congressional legislation. In support of this posi­
tion he cites extensively from The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787.^36
J. Black next turns to criticize Goldberg's argument 
that judges need not use their "personal and private 
notions" in striking down state legislation- Black conclu­
des such personal justifications cannot be validated for the 
following reasons: (1) the Court cannot take Gallup polls;
(2) there is no modern scientific way to determine "what 
traditions are rooted in the 'collective conscience of our 
people'"; (3) the Framers did not intend the Ninth Amendment 
to give the federal judiciary veto power over state legisla­
tion; (4) the history of the Ninth Amendment shows its 
intent was to limit, not broaden, federal powers; (5) the 
"broad unlimited power" to hold laws unconstitutional 
because offensive is not based on the Constitution, but is
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"bestowed on the Court by the Court"; and (6) the power the 
Court has given itself makes the "Court's members a day-to- 
day constitutional convention."13?
J. Black accuses the Court of "Lochnerizing" and taking 
over the proper role of the legislature "to invalidate sta­
tutes because of application of 'natural law' deemed to be 
above and undefined by the Constitution is . . . [to] roam
at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to 
reasonableness . . . ."138
Justice Black again quotes Judge Learned Hand regarding 
invalidating "offensive" legislation: "For myself it would
be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, 
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do 
not."139 He then concludes his opinion with the statement 
that the Connecticut statutes are "not forbidden by any pro­
vision of the Federal Constitution as that Constitution was 
written . . .",140 for which reason he would uphold their
constitutionality.
The final opinion in the case is written by Justice 
Potter Stewart and adds little to Black's analysis. He 
begins by calling the Connecticut statutes an "uncommonly 
silly law," "unwise" and "asinine."141 However, the statu­
tes do not violate the Federal Constitution. He finds no 
"general right of privacy" in: (1) the Bill of Rights; (2)
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any part of the Constitution; (3) any case ever decided by 
the C o u r t . 142 He concludes by saying the Court should 
subordinate its personal views and own ideas of proper 
legislation, while allowing the people to follow the proper 
constitutional procedure for removing laws from the books, 
viz., persuading their elected representatives to repeal the
l a w . 1 4 3
What is disturbing about both Black’s and Stewart's 
analysis is the continual insistence on judicial interpreta­
tion as clearly black and white. The judge either looks at 
the specific words of the Constitution itself and uses these 
as the only basis for a decision, or the judge falls into 
mere personal preference, i.e., subjectivistic/relativistic 
decisions. One either follows the letter of the 
Constitution or is adrift, anchorless, without principle, in 
a sea of possible personal preferences.
This is a false dichotomy, with serious inherent flaws. 
Though some of the problems with this approach were outlined 
earlier in this paper, it is important that the inherent 
dangers be understood. First, this position constitutes a 
denial of the basic human situation, i.e., of the heuristic 
task of interpreting even the basically "clear" things in 
life. Secondly, it is a failure to acknowledge the fun­
damental insight that we do not control language and cannot 
delimit rigid parameters within which language is forced to
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fit and give its meaning. In the essays "Poetically Man 
Dwells"144 and "Language,"145 Martin Heidegger develops the 
conception of "the true relation of dominance between 
language and man. For, strictly, it is language that 
speaks."146 Heidegger develops the idea that language leads 
man around by the nose. We do not control the way even con­
temporary utterances come to have meaning or the many 
variations and interpretations possible. When one tries to 
limit the "intent of the Framers" to explicit words written 
over two-hundred years ago, the problem is compounded many 
times over. A third serious problem with Black's analysis 
is the tendency to put oneself in the position of having the 
"one true interpretation" of the Constitution. This 
authoritarian approach to the Constitution leaves no room 
for debate or principled analysis. The corresponding danger 
is, of course, that one has adopted a position, based on an 
interpretation of the Constitution, while believing that one 
is only following the "true" constitutional interpretation 
which is, in Black's view, ultimately not an 
"interpretation" at all. The fourth problem with the 
Black/Stewart analysis is that it adopts the entire 
fact/value dichotomy mentioned earlier in this paper. Facts 
are graspable and understandable, they have substance and 
solidity, while values are fleeting and are merely
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expressions of personal preferences. This program would 
deny the values underlying the specific amendments in the 
Constitution and treat the words, what is really "there," as 
a given. No inquiry into "mushy" values is allowed, as all 
that is certain are the explicit words as given. The danger 
here, as stated earlier, is the total loss of spirit which 
animates and gives continued force to the Constitution. If 
the Constitution is to remain a vital document, continued 
acknowledgement of the values which gave rise to it and of 
the forces which give rise to the values, is essential. 
Finally, Black's approach is an example of modern man's 
desire to be in control, to have the parameters of relevance 
and significance within one's direction. If one need not 
engage in serious debate and effort in order to determine 
what the true values in the Constitution are and how to be 
most true to them, i.e., if this is merely mechanical, then 
judges are in "control" of constitutional analysis.
Heidegger also offers valuable insight into this drive to 
control in his essay "The Question Concerning Technology."
Black himself says we have no scientific means to 
determine the traditions rooted in the people’s collective 
c o n s c i e n c e . T h i s  is a reflection of the desire for 
control and certainty which would gladly do away with the 
human decision maker for the promise of knowing, without
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question, that the proper decision was reached.
The second area of case law examined here is tort law, 
specifically MacPherson v. Buick. It raises interesting 
additional issues, as the principles in a common law area, 
such as torts, are not as explicit as in a constitutional 
case. This thesis, therefore, first looks to two authori­
ties in tort law, viz., William Prosser and Clarence Morris, 
for statements of some of the principles underlying the law 
of torts. The thesis then outlines Judge Cardozo's opinion.
First of all, it will be helpful to outline some 
general principles, cited by Prosser, which affect tort 
liability. A tort is, in simple terms, a civil wrong. The 
person who has been injured (plaintiff) brings an action 
(lawsuit) against the person who has "wronged" him 
(defendant). A common tort situation would involve a per­
sonal injury resulting from a car accident. If the injured 
party sued the driver of the other vehicle for negligence,
this would be a tort action.
It is a fundamental principle of tort law that the fact
a plaintiff has suffered a loss is not, in and of itself, a
sufficient reason to make the defendant liable for the loss. 
Prosser cites several factors affecting tort liability, 
including: (1) the moral aspect of defendant's conduct,
i.e., "no liability without fault" (though this has changed
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somewhat in recent strict liability actions); (2) historical 
development (new social ideas); (3) convenience of admi­
nistration ("floodgates" argument, e.g., no liability for 
cruel words, jostling in public, etc.); (4) capacity to bear 
loss (finding a reason to shift loss to defendant who can 
better bear it); and (5) preventing future harm and 
punishing wrongdoers (punitive damages). Prosser also 
refers to the motive of the defendant and says it is often 
determinative whether the "social value of the objective is 
sufficient to outweigh the gravity of the interference."149 
Finally, Prosser's view is of the "law of torts as battle­
field of the conflict between capital and labor . . . and
others who have conflicting claims in the economic 
struggle."150
Clarence Morrisl^l gives a similar, though less 
detailed, analysis of the principles underlying the law of 
torts. Morris is concerned to stress the relation of "tort 
law and the common good." He sees the central problem of 
most tort cases as "whether plaintiff or defendant should 
bear a loss,"152 and lists his basic axiom as follows; "A 
loss should lie where it has happened to fall unless some 
affirmative public good will result from shifting it."153 
Morris is against the use of public power unless such legal 
intervention will advance the "public good." A shift is
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justified only when affirmative policy reasons can be given 
for requiring the defendant to bear a loss."154
These are commonly viewed as the underlying principles 
of the law of tort, even if not made explicit in individual 
cases. The leading case of MacPherson v. Buick provides an 
excellent illustration of the application of some of these 
principles.
MacPherson v. Buick is a landmark case in the law of 
torts. The fact situation of the case is as follows: Buick
Motor Co., the defendant, is an auto manufacturer. Buick 
sold a car to a retail dealer, which the dealer resold to 
MacPherson, the plaintiff. While plaintiff was driving the 
car, one of the wheels suddenly collapsed, throwing 
MacPherson out of the car and injuring him. The wheel 
collapsed because it was made of defective wood and its 
spokes crumbled into fragments. Buick did not make the 
wheel, but bought it from another manufacturer. The evi­
dence indicated, however, that the defects were discoverable 
by reasonable inspection, and that such an inspection was 
not made. There was no claim the defendant willfully con­
cealed or even knew of the defect. The defendant is thus 
not charged with fraud, but negligence. "The question to be 
determined is whether the defendant owed a duty of care and 
vigilance to anyone but the immediate purchaser."155
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A little background on this issue is important in 
understanding the context of J. Cardozo's decision. In 
Winterbottom v. W r i g h t , 156 the Court of Exchequer held that 
the breach of a contract to keep a mailcoach in repair after 
it was sold did not give rise to a cause of action, in 
contract or tort, on behalf of a passenger in the coach who
was injured when it collapsed. This case was generally
interpreted to mean there was no liability for a contracting 
party to one with whom he was not in a relationship of 
"privity." This meant that an original seller of goods was 
not liable for damages caused by their defects to anyone but 
the immediate buyer. Several reasons were advanced for this 
position.
One was that the seller's misconduct was not the
cause of the damage to the consumer in a legal
sense, because no such harm was to be antici­
pated from any defects in the goods, and there 
was an intervening resale by a responsible 
party, which 'insulated the negligence of the 
manufacturer' . . . .  A second reason, which 
was typical of the social viewpoint of the nine­
teenth century, was that it would place too 
heavy a burden upon manufacturers and sellers to 
hold them responsible to hundreds of persons at 
a distance whose identity they could not even 
know, and that it was better to let the consumer 
suffer.
The courts created several exceptions to Winterbottom, 
the most important of which held a seller liable to third 
persons for the sale of an article "imminently" or 
"inherently" dangerous to human safety. J. Cordozo in his
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opinion in MacPherson focuses on Thomas v. Winchester,158 a 
leading case, which allowed a customer to recover damages 
from the manufacturer/seller of a falsely labeled poison, 
even though the sale was made by a druggist in between the 
original seller and customer. The rationale for the holding 
in Thomas, according to J. Cardozo, was that a falsely 
labeled poison is likely to injure anyone who receives it 
and there is a duty to avoid the injury because the danger 
is foreseeable. The Court cited cases where manufacturers 
were not subject to a duty absent contract and distinguished 
these cases on the basis that the manufacturer's negligence 
was not likely to result in harm to any but an immediate 
purchaser.
Cardozo spends a paragraph on subsequent cases which 
give a "narrow construction" of the principle of Thomas and 
then turns to those cases which "evince a more liberal 
spirit."159 The first case in the latter category is Devlin 
V. Smith, w h i c h  involved the defendant's construction of 
a scaffold for a painter. When the painter's employees were 
injured due to its collapse, the defendant contractor was 
held to owe them a duty, irrespective of his contract with 
their employer, to build the scaffold with care, since he 
knew the scaffold would be used by the workmen and also knew 
the scaffold was dangerous if improperly constructed. In
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Statler v. Ray Mfg. C o . ,161 the defendant manufactured a 
large coffee urn which was installed in a restaurant. The 
urn exploded when used, injuring the plaintiff. The Court 
held the manufacturer liable.
J. Cardozo acknowledges that Devlin and Statler may 
have extended the rule of Thomas. "If so, this court is 
committed to the extension."162 cardozo rejected the 
"restricted meaning" of "inherently dangerous" as something 
whose usual function is to injure or destroy. A scaffold, 
while not inherently destructive, becomes such if imper­
fectly constructed and "A large coffee urn may have within 
itself, if negligently made, the potency of danger, yet no 
one things of it as an implement whose normal function is 
destruction."163
Cordozo thus acknowledges his commitment to the exten­
sion of Thomas, as evidenced in Devlin and Statler. This is 
an extension of protection to the consumer/user, not part of 
the prior law. Cardozo also refers to this movement as "the 
trend of judicial thought."164
In addition to the change in the meaning of a "thing of 
danger," i.e., reasonably certain to place life and limb in 
peril when negligently made, the element of contract or pri­
vity is also changed. "If to the element of danger there is 
added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other
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than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then 
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of 
danger is under a duty to make it carefully."165 in addi­
tion, the Court added a requirement of the manufacturer's
knowledge of probable danger. "The presence of a known
danger, attendant upon a known use, makes vigilance a 
duty."166 Finally, the obligation of the manufacturer does 
not arise from contract: "We have put the source of the
obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in 
the law."16 7
Cardozo is saying the obligation of the manufacturer is 
so important that it cannot rest on a contractual basis 
alone, but deserves a stronger foundation in the law. It is 
Cardozo* s point that the Court ought to extend such protec­
tion to consumers/users, by law, and J. Cardozo does so.
At a later point in his argument, Cardozo points out
the nature of an auto gives warning of probable danger if it
is defectively constructed. MacPherson*s car was designed 
to go fifty miles an hour and, without sound wheels, injury 
was almost certain. He then analogizes the case to a defec­
tive railroad engine and concludes they are equally things
of danger. In declining to follow Winterbottom, J. Cardozo 
commented: "Precedents drawn from the days of travel by
stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel today. The
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principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, 
but the things subject to the principle do change. They are 
whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization 
require them to be."168
Several points are important in this statement. First 
is Cardozo’s distinguishing the precedent of Winterbottom. 
This shows the case to be of a different type and past judi­
cial history is not merely being discarded. The second 
important point is Cardozo's adherence to principle, which 
he says does not change. This establishes continuity, 
within a decision which looks revolutionary. It is an 
attempt to show the order and fidelity to principle which 
underlies MacPherson. Finally, Cardozo states the things 
subject to the principle depend upon social progress. In 
summary, the three important steps in Cardozo's analysis 
are: (1) distinction; (2) faithful adherence to principle;
and (3) social progress.
Cardozo makes use of a second analogy in his justifica­
tion for the MacPherson decision:
There is nothing anomalous in a rule which im­
poses upon A, who has contracted with B, a duty 
to C and D and others according as he knows or 
does not know that the subject matter of the 
contract is intended for their use . . .  if A 
leases a building to be used by the lessee at 
once as a place of entertainment . . . injury to
persons other than the lessee is to be foreseen, 
and foresight of the consequences involves the
creation of a d u t y . 1^9
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This is a good analogy, as it draws upon a different 
substantive area of law (property) to show foreseeability 
involves the creation of a duty.
Cardozo concludes the opinion by holding Buick Motor 
Co. liable to MacPherson because, as a manufacturer of 
autos, it was responsible for the finished product and is 
not absolved from the duty of inspection and testing of com­
ponent parts. Buick should not have relied on the skill of 
the wheel manufacturer, but has a higher duty of care and 
inspection to the user.
MacPherson v. Buick is a good example of a principled 
approach to legal reasoning for several reasons. First, 
Cardozo openly acknowledges that he is committed to 
extending protection to plaintiffs and holding manufacturers 
liable for their products. Citing case law which tended to 
broaden the definition of inherently dangerous, he refers to 
"trends of judicial thought." Cardozo also acknowledges 
such an important obligation should be enforced by law and 
not depend on a contractual relation analysis. The basis of 
this "ought" is never made explicit by Cardozo, but seems 
rather to be between the lines of the opinion. It is the 
weakest aspect of the opinion that Cardozo does not develop 
more policy behind the decision. The use of principled 
discourse might allow an appeal to commonality regarding who
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should be liable and whether it is fair that defendant Buick 
Motor Co. be or not be liable in this situation. Again, I 
believe this underlies Cardozo's analysis, but it is never 
made explicit in the opinion. For example, Cardozo could 
have explicitly appealed to the commonality of the reader, 
by asking whether it is just that MacPherson bear the 
responsibility for the original condition of the wheels on 
his car. This might involve an explicit economic analysis, 
or a moral claim regarding the appropriateness of loss 
shifting. It might also require an investigation of why it 
is appropriate to hold manufacturer's responsible for their 
products. Though this part of the opinion could be more 
explicit, Cardozo does responsibly articulate the principles 
underlying tort law, as illustrated by Prosser and Morris, 
and apply them with good judgment and sensitivity.
Cardozo's distinguishing of cases, his stated adherence 
to established principle and his concern with developing a 
legal system responsive to the needs of a changing society 
are strong points in this opinion and constitute open 
acknowledgement of the sources and bases for his decision. 
Cardozo is concerned with the best possible justification, 
all things considered, for his decision and clarifies the 
principles he is following.
His concern is to draw upon all previous case law and
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put it into a coherent framework. He clearly does not want
the law to appear as unprincipled chaos, but rather wants
his "chapter" of the novel to fit into the structure as a
whole, i.e., to actually ^  a novel. In this way, Cardozo
can reinterpret what has gone before and influence what
comes after. Such a principled approach to decision making
is well within the framework proposed earlier in this paper.
It is illustrative to read the disssenting opinion in
MacPherson by Chief Justice Willard Bartlett. Judge
Bartlett stated:
I think that these rulings . . . extend the
liability of the vendor of a manufactured
article further than any case which has yet 
received the sanction of this court . . . .  I 
do not see how we can uphold the judgment in the 
present case without overruling what has been so 
often said by this court and other courts of 
like authority in reference to the absence of 
any liability for negligence on the part of the 
original vendor of an ordinary carriage to 
anyone except his immediate vendee.170
It is, of course, just such rigid adherence to prece­
dent that Cardozo and a principled approach to law avoid.
It is this sort of supposedly "neutral" following of prece­
dent that can be most dangerous because it is self-deceptive 
in refusing to acknowledge both the social view which is 
being reinforced through law and the participation of the 
decision maker himself in the result. The social view the 
dissenting opinion would reinforce is that the manufacturer
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cannot be burdened with the expense of paying for injures to 
those with whom there is no direct contractual relationship. 
The participation of the decision maker is as human being 
(or as close as a lawyer can come to being human), who is 
faced with prior decisions, a present case, personal pre­
ferences, policy arguments, equitable concerns, political 
history, moral tradition, constitutional background, etc.
The judge's hands are not tied and he should not act as if 
they are. This is not, of course, to say precedent can be 
thrown out the window with each case before the bench. It 
is to affirm, however, that although Judge Bartlett's opi­
nion would have the reader believe he is just following 
proper procedures, judicial decision making is not, and 
should not be, a mechanical process.
Chapter III now places this thesis within the liberal 
judicial tradition and defendas it against an important new 
legal tradition, the "critical theorists." The chapter then 
concludes with some thoughts on the ultimate import of any 
theory of judicial decision making.
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CHAPTER III
It is important to note that Dworkin's naturalist 
approach and the principled discourse method of legal justi­
fication are well within the liberal political orientation 
and the liberal judicial tradition. Liberalism is used here 
as that political and legal philosophy which is 
distinguished by a firm line of demarcation between the pri­
vate and public realms.171
Liberals conceive public institutions as the only 
authority which may legitimately proscribe individual 
action. Traditionally a liberal government is seen to 
endorse no specific theory of what is good for individuals 
in their private lives. "The theory of the good espoused by 
Liberalism is that the state should not endorse any par­
ticular theory of the g o o d . "172 Liberal legal theorists 
have built theories of judicial decision-making consistent 
with the public/private realm distinction. Though liberal 
theorists may differ on details regarding the working out of 
a liberal jurisprudence,
They share fundamental beliefs: the idea that
rational decision does guide judicial discre­
tion, that pre-existing rules and principles can 
be applied to a new situation in a disciplined 
manner, that individual choices can be made (and 
indeed are desirable), that reason is powerful, 
and that analysis is p o s s i b l e . 173
underlying liberalism's position of not advocating any
72
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specific theory of the good are, of course, substantive 
liberal ideals. Liberalism generally maintains that 
treating individuals with equal respect and concern requires 
free choice by individuals. Only if individuals are treated 
as being capable of free choice in matters of private mora­
lity are they being treated as equals. Consider the 
following two statements;
liberalism insists that government must treat 
people as equals in the following sense. It 
must impose no sacrifice or constraint upon any 
citizen in virtue of an argument that the citi­
zen could not accept without abandoning his 
sense of his equal worth . . . .  So liberalism 
as based on equality justifies the traditional 
liberal principle that government should not enforce private m o r a l i t y .
a liberal state must be neutral on what may be 
called the question of the good life. The 
constitutive morality of liberalism— its 
requirement that people be treated with equal 
respect and concern— presupposes that many 
conflicting and even incommensurable conceptions 
of what is good in life may be fully compatible 
with free, autonomous, and rational action. A 
liberal state allows these conceptions to com­
pete with and to accommodate each other within 
institutions or arrangements that are fair or 
neutral among them.l?^
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice is, of course, foundational
in presenting the ideas underlying treating persons with
equal respect and concern. His view of these issues is most
evident in his definition of primary goods as things persons
would want whatever else they would want.
The position on judicial interpretations proposed in
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this thesis is consistent with liberalism as outlined above, 
though it involves explicit recognition of the deeper 
substantive values of liberalism which sometimes go unre­
cognized by liberals themselves. It is contended, moreover, 
that this position is not subject to the critical theorists' 
charges of formalism, objectivism and instrumentalism, which 
might be leveled at any liberalism which fails to 
acknowledge its substantive ideals.
The "radical critique" of liberal theories of judicial 
decision-making attacks liberalism at its f o u n d a t i o n s . 176 
This paper will focus on the work of Robert Unger, a major 
figure in the critical legal studies movement and Professor 
of Law at Harvard University.
Unger believes that two basic concerns characterize the 
critical legal studies tradition. The first is a critique 
of formalism and objectivism. In its extreme form, for­
malism proposes a deductive or quasi-deductive method for 
attaining determinate solutions to particular legal 
problems, i.e., "the search for a method of deduction from a 
gapless system of rules."I?? However, this conception of 
formalism is the limiting case and a "straw man." The real 
meaning of formalism which Unger seeks to counter "is a com­
mitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibility 
of, a method of legal justification that can be clearly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
contrasted to open-ended disputes about the basic terms of 
social life, disputes that people call ideological, philo­
sophical or visionary."178 The formalism Unger describes 
"characteristically invokes impersonal purposes, policies 
and principles as an indispensable component of legal 
r e a s o n i n g . "179 This is the neutrality which traditional 
liberals often seek to try to provide.
Formalism's second major thesis, as outlined by Unger, 
is that "legal doctrine" is only realizable through an 
essentially apolitical analysis. Unger defines legal 
doctrine as a form of conceptual practice with two charac­
teristics: (1) "the willingness to work from the institu­
tionally defined materials of a given collective tradition"; 
and (2) "the claim to speak authoritatively within this 
tradition . . .  to affect the application of state 
power."180 unger restates this second thesis as the belief 
in a fundamental difference between law making and law 
application, with legislation "guided only by the looser 
rationality of ideological conflict."181
Unger next defines objectivism, the second liberal 
principle which the critical legal studies movement attempts 
to discredit. Objectivism is "the belief that the authori­
tative legal materials— the system of statutes, cases and 
accepted legal ideas— embody and sustain a defensible scheme
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of human association. They display, though always imper­
fectly, an intelligible moral order."182 Alternatively the 
system is viewed as the result of constraints, such as eco­
nomic efficiency, which have a normative force when combined 
with human desires. Objectivism rejects the view that laws 
are "merely the outcome of contingent power struggles or of 
practical pressures lacking in rightful authority."183
The modern lawyer, Unger argues, can't keep his for­
malist perspective without maintaining the objectivist 
assumptions. Formalism presupposes objectivism. One can't 
switch from speaking of legislative interest group politics 
to invoking impersonal purpose, policy or principle in a 
judicial setting. If one invokes formalistic principles, 
Unger argues, these come from either: (1) a moral or prac­
tical order exhibited by the materials themselves; or (2) a 
normative theory extrinsic to the law. If the latter is 
true, then, even if the foundation were established indepen­
dently of the law, many areas of law would be viewed as 
"mistakes," as varying from much accepted legal precedent, 
Unger claims this would cause the destruction of an essen­
tial part of the "formalist creed," viz., the contrast of 
doctrine with ideology and political prophecy. The for­
malist would thus be transformed into "a practitioner of the 
free-wheeling criticism of established arrangements and
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received ideas."184
Unger advocates the abandonment of objectivism and the 
adoption of an "heroic" approach. This can be done by 
"carrying over to the interpretation of rights the same 
shameless talk about interest groups that is thought per­
missible in a legislative setting."185 unger uses the 
example of a statute which represented a victory for sheep 
herders over cattlemen. This statute "would be applied, 
strategically, to advance the former's aims and to confirm 
the latter's defeat."186
This liberal understanding of doctrine and formalism 
needs to be abandoned, according to Unger, and legal 
reasoning viewed as an extension of legislative struggle. 
This conception of legal "analysis" would dramatically alter 
the way we look at rights. "The security of rights, so 
important to the idea of legality, would fall hostage to the 
context-specific calculations of e f f e c t . "187
Unger ends his argument by noting that a second charac­
teristic theme of leftist movements in modern legal thought 
is "the purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal 
doctrine to advance leftist aims."188 The connection be­
tween these themes, i.e., the skeptical critique and the 
"strategic militancy" is negative because it is "almost 
entirely limited to the claim that nothing in the nature of
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law or in the conceptual structure of legal thought . . . 
constitutes a true obstacle to the advancement of leftist 
aims."189
Unger's challenges to liberalism and liberal legal 
theory relate directly to the program of this paper and must 
therefore be addressed. A traditional liberal legal 
theorist, including Rawls to a certain extent, holds a posi­
tion which could be called neutrality liberalism. It is 
important to acknowledge the considerable force of Unger's 
critique against this strand of liberal thought. Rawls, for 
example, speaks of "primary goods" as goods which cut across 
all social classes. They are neutral, in that they repre­
sent things that all people want, regardless of whatever 
else they want. This conception of primary good subjects 
Rawls' view to the charge of formalism, because he believes 
the neutral or impersonal nature of primary goods is fun­
damental to his liberal theory. Indeed, any liberalism 
which seeks to invoke impersonal or neutral principles, pur­
poses or policies, or governmental instrument, will be sub­
ject to Unger's formalist critique. Unger is also correct 
in maintaining that traditional liberal formalism presup­
poses objectivism. A neutral formalist principle, such as 
Rawls' conception of primary goods, presupposes that the 
political order is an intelligible moral order.
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Unger's critique of neutrality liberalism does not have 
the same force against the conception of liberal decision­
making advocated here, which might be called naturalism 
liberalism. The use of testimony and appeal and the 
acknowledgement of the sources which animate the law 
substantially enriches the liberal justification of the 
legal system. That is, the position of legal decision­
making developed here is not open to the same formalist or 
objectivist charges, because the focus here is not on the 
neutral or impersonal nature of the purposes, policies and 
principles appealed to. Rather, the emphasis is on what 
liberal values are to be found by a living, existing deci­
sion maker. This is anything but impersonal, as the 
involvement and participation of the individual is decisive, 
and it is not neutral, in an empty sense, because the law is 
seen to have force and meaning only through the par­
ticipation and involvement of the decision-maker. The posi­
tion developed in this paper thus constitutes a defense of a 
naturalistic liberalism. This thesis shows this position to 
be vital, adaptable and workable. The analysis of Justice 
Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick shows how a principled, con­
cerned approach to law can show the system to be "a defen­
sible scheme of human association." Griswold v. Connecticut 
also shows the respect for fundamental rights and the
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sensitivity inherent in the liberal view of legal justifica­
tion.
With regard to Unger's claim that one cannot adopt for­
malism without objectivism, it is possible to acknowledge 
the role and force interest groups play in legislative set­
tings and the outside forces which could and sometimes do 
influence judges. This does not mean, however, that all 
judicial decision making is determined by the pressures and 
competition of special interest groups. In addition, it 
does not mean that what _î  the case is necessarily what 
ought to be the case.
Unger sets up a false dichotomy in saying that for­
malist principles must be founded either in an order exhi­
bited by the materials themselves, or an extrinsic normative 
theory. The best possible political justification, all 
things considered, would be true to the materials themselves 
and their historical background. While it might indeed also 
draw from a normative theory, this would not necessarily be 
extrinsic to the law. The liberal theorist's use of a nor­
mative theory does not transform him into a "free-wheeling" 
critic of legal tradition. The judge is bound by the tradi­
tion as a whole and the constraint of creating a "coherent 
novel." If a decision or series of decisions create too 
many "mistakes," then the law will be unprincipled, result
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oriented law. This, however, would be a malfunction or 
aberration in the system and not established practice. 
Naturalistic liberalism still maintains a strong distinction 
between "doctrine" and "political prophecy." It is just 
that Unger, with his view of the decadence of capitalistic, 
neutrality liberalism, is unable to see the possibility of a 
liberal decision-making which is adaptable and vital in the 
way the conception of judicial decision proposed here would 
require.
One final concern needs to be addressed in this thesis 
relating to the possible charge of subjectivism being 
leveled against the liberal judicial program outlined 
herein. "Subjectivism" refers to the belief that all deci­
sions are merely personal preferences and that there are no 
norms whatsoever which can be appealed to for guidance. It 
is the belief that there is no truth, that one opinion is as 
good as any other and that there is, in principle, no 
possible way to discriminate between conflicting views, 
other than by personal preference. Thus, there exists, 
ultimately, only opinion and not knowledge. The importance 
of defending against subjectivism can be seen by reference 
to Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold. Black 
quotes J. Learned Hand's "Platonic Guardian" terminology and 
adopts a theory which admits of only two possible alter-
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natives: literalism or subjectivism. Thus, Justice Black
would attack the program of this thesis as subjective and 
mere personal opinion. In addition to the criticisms of 
Black's position listed earlier in this paper,19 0 his belief 
that all non-literal judicial interpretation is mere opinion 
shows his own position as nihilistic. Since very few 
jurists can accept Black's literalist position, his charge 
that any other position is subjective must be examined and 
the nihilistic character of his own thought must be brought 
out. Perhaps reference to an old friend from the history of 
philosophy can supply a useful setting for discussion of 
these last important issues.
Plato's Republic^^^ is, first of all and largely in 
Book I, a conceptual investigation into the nature of 
justice. Secondly, it is an attempt to work out the ideal 
state, to see what the form of such a state would be like. 
The Republic marks the watershed of Plato's development and 
is the best expression of his ideas on justice.
The dialogue begins with a superficial discussion with 
Cephalus and Polemarchus on the nature of justice. Cephalus 
essentially defines justice as luxury, while Polymarchus 
defines it as giving to others what they are owed. Socrates 
refutes both of these definitions. The discussion begins in 
earnest with the appearance of Thracymacus, who enters the
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dialogue at 336b. Thracymacus is described as *'a wild beast 
about to spring," and advances on Socrates and his company 
"as if to tear us to pieces." He is also compared to a 
wolf192 as Socrates refers to an old Greek proverb which 
had it that if a wolf sees you first, you go dumb. These 
bestial references are to the uncivilized conduct and 
beliefs of Thracymacus and bring the element of strength 
forward at an early stage. After some initial banter about 
his not wanting to follow Socrates' procedures, Thracymacus 
is pressed to give his definition of justice. "Listen then, 
said he. I say that the just is nothing else than the 
advantage of the s t r o n g e r . "193 Several points are 
noteworthy about Thracymacus' statement. First, his "listen 
then" has a ring of "now here this," i.e., of a pronoun­
cement from the Oracle at Delphi. Secondly, his statement 
that justice is "nothing else" than the stronger's interest 
is of the same oracular nature. This is further borne out 
by Thracymacus' entire manner throughout the course of the 
dialogue.
At 339a Socrates states he does not know whether 
Thracymacus is right, but will attempt to find out. At 340a 
Cleitophon uses the words "bear witness." This switch to 
legal language is suggestive of a trial motif and could be a 
reference to Socrates' trial. Grube puts the dramatic
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setting of the dialogue at 411 B.C. This places the dialo­
gue in the closing years of the war with Sparta, which 
Athens was losing and likely ultimately to lose. It was a 
time of turmoil and decline, the war would soon be over (in 
405 B.C.) and the Thirty Tyrants installed. The dialogue 
takes place in Piraeus, a port city of Athens and a center 
of resistance to tyranny. Polemarchus was put to death by 
the Thirty Tyrants and Socrates was implicated in their 
actions and later put to death by the restored democracy. 
These details help focus what is at issue in the Republic, 
viz., what justice really is, in the face of real tyranny. 
Two of the participants in the theoretical discussion will 
be put to death by this tyranny. Plato is giving 
Thracymacus' argument its due force. Indeed, the best proof 
that Thracymacus is right, is that Socrates is put to death. 
If justice is the interest of the stronger, then government 
is always an instrument of someone, i.e., the people in 
power. Of course, legislation does get passed this way, 
bills get through Houses of Congress because of power, etc. 
Although Thracymacus' definition is true, as evidenced by 
the prosecution and death of Socrates, it is also false, 
Plato shows, because of these very barbarous acts.
Thracymacus speaks for an entire epoch of Athenian 
history. As was clearly manifested by Cleon, Pericles, the
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Thirty Tyrants and the restored democracy, there is no real 
justice. Justice and power both change. There was no 
belief in an external standard by which to judge truth.
This extreme form of moral relativism, the belief that there 
are no real values and no distinction among values, is a 
form of nihilism. For if all values are merely subjective, 
i.e., merely the opinions of individuals, then every opinion 
is "true." However, if every opinion is true, then distinc­
tions are no longer possible. Truth and falsity have no 
more meaning and all values are equally true and equally 
false. This is nihilism, pure and simple.
Thracymacus is thus seen to be a pure empiricist. The 
only real things are facts, what people actually do, and one 
is never justified by an appeal to the ideal, i.e., in 
Unger's sense, a disinterested principle, policy or purpose. 
Plato, however, shows the inherent flaw in refusing to 
acknowledge the ideal. Thracymacus says the best city is 
the most completely unjust c i t y . 194 He moves, that is, from 
a statement on general practice to a generalization about 
human nature. This is using human nature as a ground of 
inference for a moral claim, i.e., of letting what the 
case determine what ought to be the case. Socrates' pur­
pose, in the remaining nine books of the Republic, is to 
show that practice is not a good indicator of either truth
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or justice. The critical move Thracymacus makes is the 
movement from general practice (what is) to what is natural 
(what ought to be). Socrates sees this "naturalistic" argu­
ment as false and dangerous.
Though it is the enterprise of Books Two through Ten of 
the Republic to show how the is/ought fit together, i.e., 
how the ideal can incorporate the actual, some general 
observations can be made regarding the danger, as Plato per­
ceived it, with Thracymacus' position. The inherent danger 
is that nihilism or moral scepticism can be and has turned 
into a thoughtless absolutism under the right circumstances. 
Justice _is the advantage of the stronger, the argument goes, 
and this ought to be the case. Thus, description is turned 
into prescription and the actual is elevated to the status 
of the ideal.
Black's theory of judicial decision-making is thus 
shown to be problematical. If literalism is rejected (as it 
is by practically every jurist but Justice Black), the only 
alternative he allows is subjectivism. This leads to nihi­
lism for the reasons outlined above. The result is that 
Black's position essentially maintains; "I have the truth, 
even if not acknowledged by any other legal theorist." His 
position must be rejected as both literalism and subjec­
tivism lead to unacceptable consequences.
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The liberal approach to judicial decision making argued 
for here avoids these old and well recognized problems of 
subjectivism and nihilism. It does so by fidelity to prin­
ciple of the use of testimony and appeal. Absolutism is 
avoided by asserting certain principled positions with a 
foundation in testimony and appeal. The liberal conception 
advanced here acknowledges the importance of the ideal. As 
such, it is not an instrumental view of legal interpreta­
tion. There are real values in the world and these need to 
be argued for and sustained through use of the best possible 
political justification, all things considered. These 
values have different weight, which must again be argued for 
in a principled way. Truth and the right result, therefore, 
take on a role of vital importance. There is something of 
great significance at stake in reaching a proper decision. 
Since the instrumental view of law is rejected, justice is 
not merely what the people who make the decisions, i.e., the 
people in power, decide. Justice is more than the interests 
of the stronger. Justice involves a search, not an exercise 
in raw power. It is evident, therefore, that this thesis' 
position avoids the problem of absolutism/nihilism. In so 
doing, it is shown to be logically consistent, thus avoiding 
the problems with Thracymacus' position.
Plato showed the practical dangers of a failure to
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account for the ideal and the importance of responsibly 
accounting for the ideal in a clear, principled manner. 
Liberalisim*s belief in rational decision making, the appli­
cation of pre-existing rules and principles to new 
situations in a disciplined manner, and the importance of 
individual choice and the power of reason and analysis, make 
it a defensible and proper framework for judicial decision 
making. For if Plato teaches us two lessons in the 
Republic, they could be stated: underneath every nihilist
is a possible tyrant; and exercises of raw power, in legal 
guise, indicate how little justice is in justice, when 
justice i_s what justice does.
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^In dealing with both the natural law and positivist 
traditions, I will try to focus on the things which united 
the advocates of the various positions and not on the nuan­
ces or differences within them. This a "concession to the 
shortness of life," as Justice Holmes would say, as the 
multiplicity and variety of thought in these rich traditions 
is impossible to examine adequately within the scope of this 
thesis.
2381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
^Richards, Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles; The 
Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional 
Adjudication, 11 Ga, L. Rev. 1069 (1977).
5a . d'Entreves, Natural Law, An Historical Survey 
(1965) at 80.
6st. Thomas Aquinas, "Question 91," Treatise on Law 





11a . d'Entreves at 84.
12t . Aquinas at 18.
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25a . d'Entreves at 94.
26id. at 91.
27Hartf Positivism and the Separation of Law and 




3lNote that it is Blackstone's conception of natural 
law which is thus open to the positivist attack and not 
Thomas' position. The mere fact of a law, for Thomas, is 
not justification for that law's existence, nor can the 
authority of law be questioned just because of personal
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disagreement with that law. Thomas thus avoids the danger 
of both anarchy and conservatism by his clearly 








39Richards, Rules, Policies, and Neutral Principles;
The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional 





44RichardS/ The Moral Criticism of Law, (1977).
45id. at 33.
46Richards seems to view Ronald Dworkin's position in 
Taking Rights Seriously as crossing over a line into a 
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50ld. at 71.











62id. at 343 (emphasis added).






S^Dworkin's analysis is a fleshing out of the position 
he advocates against Richards on p. 342 of Taking Rights 
Seriously. There he speaks of the "threshold adequacy of 
fit" and choosing the morally soundest justification from 
those that meet the fit.
69[)workin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 Fla. L. Rev. at














S^Matthew 19:22, King James Version.
S^Note that this brings out the main problem with John 
Hart Ely's rejection of natural law in Democracy and 
Distrust. Ely discards natural law, saying that it is too 
vague and can be used to support any cause. He argues that 
if it is made more specific it is objectionable and not 
widely accepted. He concludes that we can reason about 
ethical issues, but because this is not the same thing as 
discovering "absolute ethical truth," "we’re where we were." 
(Democracy and Distrust, p. 54). It is not true, however, 
that the result of ethical discourse is to end up where one 
started. This will be the case if one views absolutes as
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the only form of moral proposition natural law can find 
acceptable. This, however, is not the case with Dworkin's 
position or with the example of testimony and appeal 
outlined here.
®^S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
(1941) at 295.
®^Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 Fla. L. Rev. at
187.






91291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
92Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487.
93id. at 488-89.
94jd. at 490.
95id. at 492-93, 520.
96id. at 493.
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101 Id. at 493, 494.
lOZld.at 511, 512
103ld. at 494.
104277 U.S. 438, 478 (19 ) .
lOScriswold, 381 U.S. at 494.
106262 U.S. 390 (1923).
107268 U.S. 510 (1925).
IO8 3 2 1 U.S. 158 (1944 ) .






1 1 5 3 7 1 U.S. 415, 438 (1962).
ll^Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498.
117id. at 499.
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125id. at 502.
White also concurs in the judgment in a separate 
opinion. His opinion, however, generally holds that there 
has been no showing that the Connecticut ban on the use of 
contraceptives by married persons affects illicit sexual 
relationships. He would hold the statutes unconstitutional 
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143ld. at 531.
l^^Martin Heidegger, "Poetically Man Dwells," in A. 
Hofstadter, Poetry, Language, Thought (tr. 1971).
145ld., M. Heidegger, "Language."
, M. Heidegger, "Poetically Man Dwells," at 216 
147Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519,
148w. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1964). 
149id, at 26.
ISOld.




IS^MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 385.
15610 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
157w. Prosser, supra note 148, at 659.
1586 N.Y. 397 (1852).
159MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 386.
16089 N.Y. 470 (1882).
161x95 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909).











l'aisée, e.g. , J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) and 
R. Dworkin, "Liberalism" in Public and Private Morality 
(1978) .
172Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29 
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 865 (1982).
173id.
174R. Dworkin, "Neutrality, Equality, and Liberalism," 
Liberalism Reconsidered (1983) at 3.
175m . Sagoff, "Liberalism and Law," Liberalism 
Reconsidered (1983) at 12.
176gee, e.g., D. Kairys, ed.. The Politics of Law; A 
Progressive Critique (1982); Trubek, Complexity and 
Contradiction in the Legal Order; Balbus and the Challenge 
of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 L. and Soc. Rev.
527 (1977) and Gross, Theory of Judicial Reasoning: Toward
a Reconstruction, 66 Ky. L.J. 801 (1977-78).
177unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. 
L. Rev. 561, 564 (1983).
178id.













190see text supra pp. 54-56.
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